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“The Eurozone Crisis” 
 
 
The European monetary union was developed and implemented initially with the future objective of a 
fiscal union, then ultimately a political union. However the current European sovereign debt crisis has 
highlighted the importance of initially having the framework and gradual implementation of a fiscal union 
far sooner than is currently being discussed. To put this into context, the 17 member Eurozone was 
established on 1
st January 1999 and on 1
st January 2002; all member currencies were replaced with the 
Euro. In 2007, a year prior to the financial crisis, Jean-Claude Trichet, then president of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) proposed a fiscal union of Eurozone countries. On January 30
th 2012, after the 
financial crisis, credit crisis and European sovereign debt crisis, 25 of the 27 EU member states signed the 
fiscal compact treaty on stability, coordination and governance in Economic and Monetary Union. This is 
after 10 years of the formal implementation of the European Monetary Union. 
 
Due  to  political  interests  and  objectives,  the  Eurozone's  biggest  failure  has  been  the  admittance  of 
periphery  countries  such  as  Greece,  which  met  the  criteria for  admittance  through  oversight  on  key 
metrics. In 2004, the Greek Finance Minister admitted that since 1999, the budget deficit of Greece was 
never below 3% of its GDP, a key requirement of entry into the Eurozone. However, at the time, the 
Greek Finance Ministry had claimed it had less in order to join the Eurozone. Other countries also were 
criticised for doing the same in order to join the Euro as quickly as possible, with Greece being the main 
culprit. Of course the main benefit of joining the strong single currency was the ability of governments to 
issue debt at lower cost, mainly thanks to stronger economies like Germany’s. Greece’s deficit climbed 
on joining the Euro and relied on heavier borrowing on the capital markets, partly as a source of funding 
for the 2004 Olympics. Even with this key admission of failure, the EU said that Greece’s membership of 
the single currency would not be questioned. Even with these mistakes, it is possible to believe that if 
there was a roadmap to fiscal union prior to the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent economic turmoil, a 
fiscally united Europe may have properly managed and avoided a sovereign debt crisis. In other words, 
due to the lack of a fiscal union, the credit crisis of 2008 eventually pushed the Eurozone into a crisis. 
 
The development of the 2008 financial crisis took the form of the collapse of the US sub-prime market, 
which  shook  the  financial  stability  of  the  banking  system,  caused  Lehman  brothers to  collapse, and 
damaged  the  global  economy.  Central  banks  and  governments  were  then  forced  into  increasing 
their deficits to re-capitalise the banking system and to enhance growth through  monetary and fiscal 
policies, which near-terminally indebted nations. In the US since the crisis started, an estimated $245bn 
has been spent, invested or loaned to banks and other financial institutions to prevent their collapse. This 
is 41% of the total $594 billion used by the US government to shore up capital across key industries. By 
comparison, the European Commission estimated in 2011 that the recapitalization of European banks has 
cost EUR 420 billion, and plans are needed for further funding. This has consequently led to the increase 
of government deficits, reduction in budgets and a severe impact on global economic growth. The IMF 
estimates that Euro area GDP growth will fall from 3% in 2007 to 1% by the end of 2012, with a gradual 
slow incline to 1.7% by 2016. So there will be slow growth until 2016, but at what cost? Euro area gross 4 
 
government debt was 66% of GDP in 2007, and forecasted to be 90% in 2011 and 2012, slowly declining 
to 86% in 2016. 
 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis highlighted the fiscal mismanagement of countries, even prior to the 
2008 financial crisis, as evidently seen with Greece. Considering the Eurozone entry’s deficit ceiling of 
3% of GDP, last year Eurostat estimated that Ireland’s deficit was 32%, Greece was 11% and Spain and 
Portugal’s 9%. Even if we describe these as the worst culprits, the Eurozone 17 members’ deficit went 
from 2.6% of GDP in 2002 to 6.1% in 2010. 
 
The  2008  financial  crisis  was  a  tipping  point  for  the  periphery  countries,  which  suffered  from  the 
shutdown of credit markets they had depended on to sell debt to. Greece used the privilege of issuing 
Euro debt immensely. In 2002, Greece’s gross debt stood at 102% of GDP or EUR 159bn. In 2010, this 
became 145% of GDP and EUR 329bn. And at what point did the markets start realising there was 
something wrong? Greece’s 10-year bond yields were relatively flat, even till the end of 2009. On 1
st 
October 2009, it was 4.6%, a year later 10.2%, then a year later 23%. Now it is approximately 34%. The 
word ‘contagion’ has been used widely to describe what has happened since 2008, with the collapse of 
Lehman  Brothers  in  September  2008  and  the  start  of  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  in  2010.  But  fiscal 
mismanagement was always clearly present. Perhaps ‘realisation’ is more of an accurate term. 
 
For the rest of the world, increasing government deficits further to combat the slowdown in economic 
growth and recession, as well as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, no longer became a solution. Fiscal 
austerity has been taken up as the bitter medicine across Europe and much of the rest of the world, but it 
has been a bitter pill to swallow and given rise to a populist movement. Riots have erupted in Greece, 
Spain and Italy over austerity plans. Students in the United Kingdom have demonstrated, sometimes 
violently, at the rising cost of University tuition. High unemployment across the region is a veritable 
indicator of the economic gloom caused by austerity; unemployment in the Euro area rose from a low of 
7.6% to an estimated 10% in 2011. 
 
Now, we are in a situation where Eurozone governments have realised that fiscal union is the only 'clean' 
solution to the sovereign debt crisis and have been trying to rush reforms through, which are still far from 
achieving anything. Plans to solve the crisis have missed the key issue. If private bondholders of Greek 
debt agreed to 50% haircuts on their holdings, would this really prevent Greece from repeating its fiscal 
mismanagement? And in what state would this leave private bondholders, some of whom are European 
banks?  Similarly  with  the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  and  European  Financial  Stability 
Mechanism,  both  EU  backed  vehicles  designed  to  support  distressed  Eurozone  states.  This  time  the 
burden is spread across the EU and financial markets. And even if there was an ‘orderly’ default of 
Sovereign debt and even expulsion of some members from the Eurozone, fiscal unity and management 
would still not be in place. Now it seems the Eurozone is ready to discuss a fiscal compact, but has it had 
enough time to plan? The fiscal union should be implemented, but the planning shouldn't be hasty. At the 
very least, countries will find it difficult agreeing to give up their fiscal authority. 
 
Short-term political objectives and lack of planning is a combination that can be seen to cause disastrous 
and long felt consequences, such as post-2003 Iraq. Although there were many reasons why Saddam 
Hussein's brutal regime should have been removed, an adequate and well-prepared plan was lacking for 
re-building the country once the regime collapsed in 2003. This has caused continuing problems in the 
following years such as political instability, insurgency attacks and sectarian warfare. The US and the UK 5 
 
have been giving until recently military support to Iraq, as well as supporting the reconstruction of the 
Iraqi  economy,  which  it  needs.  But  as  seen  before,  with  the  growing  government  deficits  of  these 
countries and the relative expense of this support, can any foreign government now afford to give Iraq or 
any other county the support it still needs? The US and Europe are firmly focused on resolving their 
economic difficulties, and asking tax-paying nationals to pay for foreign development of other nations has 
become  a  politically  sensitive  issue.  Put  into  context,  Iraq’s  financial  system  is  severely  in  need  of 
development in order to support its economy, and as such the Central Bank of Iraq wants all the banks to 
raise their capitalisation to at least $215m. But how can Iraq’s financial system recapitalise when Europe 
is having difficulty recapitalising its own banks and ensuring the financial stability of the region? 
  
And beyond Iraq, the Arab Spring has been telling. A surprise populist movement across the Middle East 
and North Africa since 2010 has shown limited direct foreign intervention compared to Iraq in 2003. 
When looking at the Gaddafi regime and the Libyan revolution of last year, foreign nations were nervous 
about intervening when Gaddafi started attacking his own people to put down a revolt. A no-fly zone was 
put in place, and arms  given  to the  rebels,  but it  seems  that  politicians  were  not  ready  to  persuade 
taxpayers to  pay  for direct  intervention, even  in the  name  of  human  rights. And  with  the  European 
sovereign debt crisis still unresolved, the view has transpired that the cost of intervention is unjustified. In 
Syria, a similar populist revolution is still taking place and being brutally put down by the regime there, 
but this time with no foreign intervention aside from economic sanctions. And finally Iran, a country 
which continues to be an uncertain threat to its neighbours through its resistance to transparency on its 
nuclear programme, as well as threatening global oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz. This time a 
country’s aggression could be external, and intervention largely has been economic sanctions such as the 
recent European oil embargo. If the situation escalates and Iran moves aggressively beyond its national 
borders, will foreign nations intervene if necessary given their domestic economic situations? 
 
As  can  be  seen,  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  has  left  powerless  directly  affected  countries  and  greatly 
weakened indirectly affected countries, even ones which were previously economically strong. The new 
‘contagion’ or ‘realisation’ might be that nations may not be able to act in foreign development or in 
intervening against foreign injustices. And one of the root causes has been not only fiscal mismanagement 
by nations, but also the availability of credit. Credit since ancient times has been an essential catalyst of 
growth. Through time and experience, the credit market has become more sophisticated and developed 
into  a  truly  global  financial  market.  The  complexity  of  the  global  financial  market  and  its  many 
stakeholders  has  meant  that  the  financial  crisis  and  subsequent  sovereign  debt  crisis  has  affected 
everyone. Greece’s EUR 329bn of gross debt was ultimately held globally by institutions and individuals, 
who will be negatively impacted by any kind of default or collapse. Credit risk has evolved into a global 
phenomenon which has not been managed effectively. 
 
And what of the ethics of the system? Greece was able to sell its debt to many ‘financially sophisticated’ 
buyers at low cost until 2010, who believed that the returns were justified or could even increase. When 
the  ‘contagion’  came,  selling  Greek  debt  and  even  trying  to  profit  from  Greece’s  collapse  through 
derivative products became endemic among the financial community. The question for many was not 
whether Greece could be saved, but ultimately could they save themselves and profit from its demise. A 
lack of risk management and questionable ethics in the financial markets has raised the question as to 
whether there is a better system without these flaws. Governments think the answer is more financial 
regulation and oversight, at the cost of growth and competition, but modern Islamic Finance, has been 
addressing these issues for the last 40 years. 6 
 
 
Islamic Finance is young, has been developed on Shariah principles and has spread globally. Although the 
centres of Islamic Finance are Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, Islamic Banks and institutions have 
spread their presence and operations globally, and can be found in the USA and UK. According to 
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, Shariah-compliant assets reached $400bn globally in 2009, and 
although small compared to conventional financial assets, is growing and the expected market size could 
be as big as $4 trillion. 
 
Islamic Finance does not charge interest, bans speculation such as using derivative products and disallows 
charging penalties to customers, charging them a fair value fee instead. A Shariah-compliant asset is a 
business that does not directly or indirectly engage in the provision of prohibited items under Islam such 
as gambling and alcohol. Islamic Finance was developed on the basis of enterprise development, profit-
sharing  partnerships  and  tangible  investing.  In  Islamic  Finance,  any  transaction  must  be  based  on  a 
tangible asset. Money cannot be borrowed without a tangible form of security of equal value, which 
makes the transaction stable. It also promotes charitable giving, where a ‘Zakat’ or mandatory donation 
must be made based on a fraction of the assets of any venture every year. Throughout the crisis the market 
for Islamic investing and financing has grown, and has been shown to be successful. From a financial 
context, when comparing the MSCI indices of Euro member companies which are Shariah-compliant 
versus  those  that  are  not,  since  January  of  2008  the  Shariah-compliant  companies  have  always 
outperformed those which were not. 
 
Islamic Finance is still a fledgling industry with a long road in its development, but it has been developed 
from  the  start  under  the  pretext  of  a  financial  system  that  controls  risk  adequately  and  has  ethical 
foundations. Perhaps the rest of the world can learn from this when it looks at how the system in place 
ultimately caused the sovereign debt crisis and how it can be prevented from happening in the future. 
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